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Using bivariate crosstabulation and multivariate regression analy-
sis this study attempted to measure the effects of political factors on 
the scope and strength of state environmental policy. Political vari-
ables included state political culture, interest group strength, parti-
sanship, gubernatorial strength, legislative professionalism, and state 
innovativeness. Scope and strength of state environmental policy was 
measured by four dependent variables. The dependent variables measured 
state initiated policy, federally intitiated policy, per capita spend-
ing, and toxic substance control efforts. 
The dependent variables measuring state initiated and federally 
initiated policies are new attempts in measuring state environmental 
policy. They are indices that combine measured characteristics of 
states' environmental policies in different areas of environmental 
concern. Overall, the four dependent variables represent a comprehen-
sive attempt to measure environmental policy in the fifty states. 
This effort is dedicated to increasing our understanding of the 
public policy process. However, without the contributions of many 
individuals this research would not have been possible. First, I would 
like to thank my wife, Lacy, for her emotional, as well as financial, 
support. Her dedication towards my education was the inspiration that 
enabled me to complete this thesis. 
In addition, my parents, Kenneth and Evelyn Reisdorph, provided 
financial support in both my undergraduate and graduate work making this 
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all possible. I will never be able to repay them in full. Although 
their financial support was important, it was their faith in my capabil-
ities, along with my sister's guidance, which gave me the incentive to 
pursue my education. 
Finally, I would like to thank my thesis adviser, Dr. Joseph Westphal, 
and my committee members, Dr. James Lawler and Dr. Barrie Blunt. Without 
their devotion to education and expertise there would be no thesis. 
Their time and advice was invaluable in the preparation of this thesis. 
Furthermore, I thank the Oklahoma State University Political Science 
Department for providing the funds for computer time to complete this 
research. 
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Our technological advances have led to massive utilization of the 
earth's resources resulting in disruption of natural systems and degrad-
ation of resources to the detrim~nt of our well being (Turk, Turk, and 
Wittes; 1972). Our ability to damage the environment reached the point 
where in the 1960's, we could no longer ignore nor accept the conse-
quences (Davies, 1970). Either we changed our activities and dealt with 
the problems of a technologically advanced world or we would watch 
thousands suffer to the brink of an ecological catastrophe when the 
earth will no longer sustain any of us. This paper deals with under-
standing what determines the changes in state environmental policy we 
have made in response to the quality of our environment during the 
1970's. 
During the decade of the 1970's our federal, state, and local 
governments adopted an unprecedented number of public policies to reverse 
the decline in environmental quality. Laws to clean our air, water, and 
land were strengthened and increased. Many of these new policies placed 
the state at the center of our efforts to protect the environment. 
Virtually, every piece of federal environmental legislation passed in 
the 1970's placed the authority for implementation in the hands of 
willing states. Plus, states increased their role in protecting the 
environment as they realized local efforts were inadequate and environ-
mental problems did not respect local government boundaries. 
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What determined the type of environmental policies a state selected? 
Which states chose to participate in federal environmental programs? Do 
political characteristics help determine the type of environmental 
policy a state will select? These are the questions this paper will try 
to understand. Specifically, this thesis will identify some of the 
determinants of state environmental policy. 
Since the "environmental decade" of the 1970's, environmental 
issues have enjoyed a prominent position in our national, state, and 
local public policy agendas. Environmental policies deal with courses 
of action taken by government institutions that effect the utilization 
and allocation of land, air, and water. With growing signs of environ-
mental strain it appears likely environmental issues will remain high on 
our public policy agenda. 
The study of environmental policies are important because of the 
unique characteristics of the formation and implementation ·of environ-
mental policy. Paul Sabatier sums up the importance of this aspect of 
environmental policy in the following statement: 
State and local environmental policy is of interest to the 
political scientist for at least two reasons: 1) It provides 
a testing ground for the study of federalism, and more generally, 
of policy formation and implementation • • • In addition, the 
very multiplicity of state and local governments makes them 
instruments for comparative studies of either the implementa-
tion of federally-initiated programs or of programs initiated 
within some states and localities but no others (Sabatier, 
1973, pp. 217-218). 
It is the understanding of the policy process as it determines 
state environmental policies that will be the focus of this research. 
In order to accomplish this understanding, we need an explanation of how 
policy is created. R. H. Salisbury (1968) created such an explanation 
in his model of the policy process shown on the following page. 
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Figure 1. Salisbury's Policy Process Model 
Salisbury ( 1968, p. 165) divides the policy process into four 
components: system resources, demand patterns, decisional system, and 
policy outputs. System resources are the socioeconomic conditions we 
all face that create wants. For example, pollution creates a want for a 
clean environment. Demand patterns are the ways groups and individuals 
present wants to the decisional system. The decisional system is the 
government with its numerous divisions and structural units. From this 
presentation of the policy process we can see each component is a deter-
minant of policy output; in addition, each component effects the other. 
From numerous studies of public policy we know system resources are 
important determinants of policy output as measured in dollars (Salis-
bury, 1968; and Dye, 1979). However, little research is available that 
measures the determinants of public policy when policy output is meas-
ured in terms of extent of change, winners or losers, method of imple-
mentation, and so forth. Since we are fairly certain system resources 
will be an accurate predictor of policy output measured in dollars, the 
emphasis of this research design will be on the demand pattern and 
decisional system effects on state environmental policy as measured by 
its scope and strength. 
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The policy process model shows demand patterns and decisional 
system characteristics as having an influence on policy output. From 
this we can conceptualize how certain types of demand patterns and 
decisional systems would lead to certain types of environmental policy. 
For example, a state with many different industries and environmental 
groups may have a weak environmental policy since there would not be a 
consensus demand among the different groups for the decisional system to 
act upon. A state characterized by a dominant industry, in which many 
people owe their livelihoods to, will probably adopt a policy which 
satisfies the dominant industry. Therefore, one prediction from the 
model might be states with fragmented demands will lead to weak policies 
that tries not to offend any faction, and states with a single demand 
will have a strong policy to achieve the particular want requiring a 
public policy. 
These are the types of predictions that will be tested in this 
analysis of state environmental policy. Does the decisional and demand 
patterns of states in part determine the scope and strength of state 
environmental policy? Because of the importance of state environmental 
policy, a better understanding of the determinants of environmental 
policy may allow decision-makers and researchers to produce better 
policy. In the preceding chapters the relevant literature will be 
reviewed, the research design introduced, and the results and conclu-
sions will be presented. 
CHAPTER II 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: WHAT IT IS AND 
WHAT DO WE KNOW? 
Literature Review of Environmental Policy 
Before proceeding further from our model of the policy process, we 
need to examine the research and observations that have been made con-
cerning the policy process and environmental policy. Have other re-
searchers analyzed the same or similar questions? Does the literature 
suggest some characteristics of demand patterns and decisional systems 
are more influential in the policy process than others? The answer is 
yes to both of these questions. 
This review of the literature will cover the policy process and the 
various factors that are considered important in determining policy 
output. The role of system resources, demand patterns, and decisional 
system factors will be examined emphasizing their effects on environ-
mental policy. Discussion of demand pattern characteristics will be 
broken into three parts: 1) ideology, 2) partisanship, and 3) interest 
groups. From this information base·and the model of the policy process 





System resources or socioeconomic variables create the wants for 
public policy. For example, one might expect in a pristine environment 
with clean air, water, and land, no desire to do something about the 
cleanliness of the environment. And one might expect support for a 
clean environment might be low if the alternative policies available to 
the people meant the loss of employment they depended on for their 
livelihoods. Furthermore, one might predict individuals who lived in 
poverty and suffered from the short-term effects of hunger, lack of 
education, unemployment, and unhealthy housing, probably, would show 
little concern for policies creating primarily long-term and often 
unknown outcomes that compete for scarce resources available to ameli-
orate poverty. Finally, one might expect studies measuring environmen-
tal concern would likely confirm the above expectations. 
The empirical analysis has not damaged the image we have of our 
predictive faculties. First, as Davies (1970) notes in a description of 
the development of environmental policy, the appearance of environmental 
degradation in colonial America resulted in localities issuing 
regulations on how to dispose of sewage, and so it went throughout the 
development of the United States, environmental regulation followed 
environmental pollution. Socioeconomic conditions create the wants 
which lead to demands for policies to protect the environment. Exactly 
what are the conditions that create wants for environmental policies? 
Do different groups of people respond differently to pollution? I have 
already suggested poor people may be less likely to demand environmental 
policies than rich. Does this difference really exist between poor and 
rich, and what other socioeconomic factors may account for differences 
in state environmental policy? 
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High concern for the environment has been found to be related to 
the more highly educated, professionals, middle to higher incomes, and 
urban living (Butte! and Flinn, 1974; Calvert, 1979; Tognacci et al, 
1972; and VanLiere and Dunlap, 1980). It should be noted that Van 
Liere and Dunlap's 1980 study of national opinion polls supported the 
above relationships, but overall the relationships were found to be only 
moderately strong. Of the above socioeconomic indicators residence 
(urban versus rural) received the most concurrence as a predictor of 
environmental support (Hays, 1981; and Lowe and Pinhey, 1982). It seems 
likely urbanization, industrialization, education, and income will be 
reliable and valid predictors of environmental policy adoption differ-
ences among the states; given the logic of the policy process model and 
the empirical evidence. 
Demand Patterns 
Partisanship. Differences in support of environmental legislation 
between Democrats and Republicans has been subject to a fair number of 
quantitative analyses. If differences do exist between numbers of the 
two dominant parties, states characterized by domination of one of the 
two major political parties may well have an environmental policy re-
flecting the dominant party's position. By knowing the nature of a 
state's political party control one could predict with accuracy the type 
of environmental policy the state has. 
In the 1960's and early 1970's as environmental issues received a 
great deal of public concern, many political scientists and political 
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elites considered environmental issues to be free from partisan divisions. 
It was postulated that neither party would take a stand of being for 
pollution. The strength and broadness of public concern for environ-
mental quality, as demonstrated by Earth Day demonstrations throughout 
the nation in 1970, was thought to be a deterrent to partisan cleavages 
in the support of environmental protection (McConnell, 1970). This 
position was supported by several scientific surveys of public opinion, 
in which no significant partisan divisions were found in environmental 
support (Munton and Brady, 1970; Dillman and Christenson, 1972; and 
Buttel and Flinn, 1978). 
Although it is reasonable to expect few to be for pollution, is is 
also plausible to predict partisan differences in support for different 
types of environmental policy. Environmental policy alternatives for 
the most part are characterized by extensive regulation on business and 
industry and changing basic free market institutions such as the rights 
of property owners (Andrews, 1980). These alternatives are often con-
trary to positions taken by the Republican Party. Riley Dunlap and 
Richard Gale summarize these characteristics as following: 
There are a number of characteristics of current policies and 
proposals aimed at halting environmental degradation which 
provide a basis for predicting that they will elicit differen-
tial levels of support from Republicans and Democrats. In 
particular, the following seem especially relevant: 1) the 
opposition of business and industry to such proposals; 2) the 
expansion of governmental regulation inherent in such propos-
als; and 3) the necessarily innovative nature of such propos-
als ••• (Dunlap and Gale, 1974, p. 672) 
Several studies of environmental policy conclude partisan differences do 
exist in the degree of support for environmental policies. Researchers 
have found partisan differences to be strongest among political elites. 
Studies of state legislators and Congressional members indicate partisan 
9 
differences occur with respect to environmental concern and actual 
policy adoption (Wandesforde-Smith, 1973). Even before environmental 
issues became a prominent agenda item, partisanship has been found to be 
an important source of environmental policy dispute (Jennings, 1969; 
Ripley, 1969; and Cleavland, 1969). In state legislative case studies 
of California and Oregon clear differences in roll-call voting can be 
seen between Republican and Democratic members (McCloskey and Zierold, 
1971; and Dunlap and Gale, 1974). Congressional role-call analysis 
provide additional evidence of partisanship divergence on environmental 
legislation (Caldwell, 1971; Kenski and Kenski, 1980; and Ritt and 
Ostheimer, 1974). Overall, the studies indicate Democrats are more 
likely to be supportive of strong environmental policies. 
In addition, public opinion surveys support partisan differences in 
environmental concern. A survey of Boulder, Colorado residents indi-
cated Democrats were much more concerned about the environment (Tognacci 
et al, 1972). Similar results were obtained from a survey of Lake Tahoe 
decision makers (Costantini and Hanf, 1972). Among college students, 
those who identify themselves as Democrats support environmental poli-
cies more strongly than Republican identifiers (Dunlap and Gale, 1972; 
and Dunlap, 1975). Finally, more broad based national surveys support 
the hypothesis that Democrats are more environmentally concerned than 
Republicans (Calvert, 1979). 
One reason that there is conflicting survey results concerning 
partisan differences in environmental concern may be caused by method-
ological differences. Dunlap states that several surveys did not con-
trol for socioeconomic variables which may distort the measure of part-
isanship differences (Dunlap, 1975). However, it now seems partisan 
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differences among political elites who directly determine environmental 
policy are very real. Those studies which find strong evidence of 
partisan differences on environmental policy are focused on the opinions 
or voting records of elected public officials. 
Ideology. In our policy process model ideology sits at the cross-
roads between the creation of wants and demand articulation. Socio-
economic conditions create wants such as cleaner water, less noise, or 
more open space. However, what determines what course of action a group 
of people will pursue to articulate their wants, and what determines the 
policy alternative a group will demand its decisional system to imple-
ment are basic questions that need to be addressed? 
Several factors play a key role in determining how groups press 
demands on the decisional system. Resources available to the group to 
present their demands, resources available to the government to enact 
alternative solutions, other factors in the policy process pursuing 
competing or conflicting objectives, and the nature of the problem are 
some of the factors determining a group's actions. However, paramount 
to all these factors is ideology. Ideology is defined below. 
Such beliefs and hopes, when integrated into a more or less 
coherent picture of 1) how the present social, economic, and 
political order operates, 2) why this is so, and whether it is 
good or bad, and 3) what should be done about it, if anything, 
may be termed an 'ideology' (Dolbeare and Dolbeare, 1976, 
pp. 2-3). 
Ideology will determine which policy alternatives and methods of articu-
lation will be acceptable to the group or individual. 
Political party affiliaton is considered to be representative of 
one's ideology and there is evidence that congruence exists between 
ideology and one's partisanship (Kirkpatrick and Jones, 1970). However, 
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partisanship especially in a nation characterized by only two major 
political parties, is at best a poor indicator of ideology. People do 
not hold only two different values or see issues as either black or 
white. Rather, there is a whole spectrum of values, feelings, and 
thoughts on what should be, what works best, what is moral, what should 
not be, etc. Although political parties try to be as close to as many 
ideologies as possible, the result is no real ideology at all. There-
fore, the gap between party elites and general members can be quite 
large (McCloskey, Hoffman, and O'Hara, 1960). 
As a result, many political scientists have examined the relation-
ship between environmental concern and ideology. Analysis of popular 
national opinion polls finds ideology to be a stronger indicator of 
environmental concern than partisanship (VanLiere and Dunlap, 1980). 
Since many environmental policy alternatives call for extensive govern-
ment involvement in business and industry, people with values of small 
government, laizze faire economy, and individual rights above society's 
rights might be expected to oppose most environmental policies and 
people who believe in public action to meet society's problems might be 
expected to favor environmental policies. This reasoning is supported 
by numerous studies which show those with liberal socio-political orien-
tations are more environmentally concerned and supportive of stringent 
policies (Butte! and Flinn, 1978; Calvert, 1979; Dunlap, 1975; Kraft, 
1973; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; and Ritt and Ostheimer, 1974). 
Differences have been found between people with liberal ideologies; 
those who are economic liberals show less environmental awareness than 
"style issue liberals" (Ritt and Ostheimer, 1974). State legislators 
who view environmental issues as economic in nature are less supportive 
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of environmental policies than those who view them as a health and 
ecological issue (Maggiotto and Bowman, 1982). In fact, one researcher 
found conservatives to be very supportive of environmental policies if 
they believed that an ecological catastrophe was eminent (Dunlap, 1975). 
In summary, liberal/conservative orientation is related to environmental 
concern. 
Interest Groups. Interest groups play a major role in linking 
public demand to the government. Interest groups influence the govern-
ment by mobilizing the public through education and political activism, 
support of candidates, lobbying government institutions, providing 
information and technical expertise to government bodies, and using 
litigation to enforce and interpret the laws in new ways. Through these 
activities interest groups articulate public demand for policies. 
In the environmental policy arena interest groups have been impor-
tant in bringing the problems of environmental degradation to the atten-
tion of the public and the government. In 1970, Earth Day demonstra-
tions across the country organized by the various environmental groups 
helped make environmental legislation one of Congress's top agenda items 
during the past decade. On the other hand, it would seem groups sup-
porting environmental protection may be at a disadvantage when compared 
to business and industry groups who may oppose many environmental poli-
cies. 
States having the front line responsibility for implementation and 
enforcement of both state and national environmental statutes face a 
difficult task. Unlike the national government state tax bases, employ-
ment, and growth can be very dependent on a few industries. This factor 
greatly magnifies business and industry interest group strength on state 
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and local governments (Davies, 1970). In addition, government officials 
both in legislative bodies and within administrative agencies rely on 
outside information and expe\rtise to make their decisions on what poli-
cies should be adopted and how they should be enforced. With greater 
resources to perform research and employ experts, business and industry 
are able to establish intimate relationships with legislators and public 
administrators by providing them with the information they need (Zeigler 
and Huelshoff, 1980). It seems state administrators and legislators are 
more responsive to expert input from engineers and professional associ-
ations (Oregon Research Institute, 1975). Morehouse (1981) measured 
interest group strength in the states and found business groups far more 
influential than other types of pressure groups. 
A Resources for the Future sponsored study of the four corner 
states (Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah) finds state legislators 
from these states have very little expertise in environmental and nat-
ural resources issues and rely on outside information furnished by 
pressure groups for voting cues (Ingram, Laney, and McCain, 1980). 
Moreover, the study concludes industry interests are better funded and 
have more technical expertise than environmental groups; however, legis-
lators, governors, and administrators were just as likely to meet with 
environmentalists as with development interests. Indeed Sharefkin and 
Page (1974) in an economists look of interest group influence on environ-
mental issues even recommend limitations should be placed on industry 
groups' efforts to influence environmental policy. In conclusion, 




Salisbury (1969) defines decisional systems as government institu-
tions that convert policy demands into actual public policies and imple-
ment them. The decisional system consists of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches of our national, state, and local govern-
ments. Political scientists often refer to the effects of the deci-
sional system on the policy process as institutional factors; in other 
words, the unique characteristics of our government institutions, such 
as structure, history-tradition, and leadership, that shape what, when, 
and how policies are to be adopted and implemented. The decisional 
system is much more than a tool to decide which policy to adopt based on 
what policy is analyzed as best or what the people want. The uniqueness 
of decisional system institutional factors have their own independent 
influence on policy decisions, so that, given the same public, same 
political elites, and same problem, a difference in the way in which 
legislators were compensated might result in two totally different 
policy choices. 
Starting with large-scale differences between states in policy 
adoption it has been found that states rated as innovative in policy 
adoption (Walker, 1969) have more modernized governmental structure 
(structures characterized by professional legislatures, strong gover-
nors, professional agencies and boards) than those who were less inno-
vative (Foster, 1978; Gray, 1973; Savage, 1978; and Walker, 1969). In 
separate case studies of state energy policy adoption it was found 
innovativeness (defined as a measure of decisional structure), was 
related to innovative energy policies adopted by the states 
(Fitzsimmons, 1983; and Regens, 1980). Comparisons by Lundqvist (1974) 
of Canadian, Swedish, and American environmental policies indicate the 
structural differences in the government organizations accounts for a 
great deal of variance in their environmental policies. 
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Literature concerning legislative institutional factor influence on 
policy is quite extensive with a great deal of agreement that profes-
sionalism, apportionment, size, leadership, and executive-legislative 
relations all effect policy adoption and implementation (Hedlund, 1984). 
However, disagreement does exist over the degree of influence and mech-
anics of institutional factor influence in the policy process, but the 
important point is there is a consensus on the existence of legislative 
factor influence. Studies specific to environmental policy show bipart-
isan professional staffs can have a positive impact on environmental 
policy adoption (Sokolow, 1970). Also, in Congress seniority and com-
mittee structure have been found to be determinants in environmental 
policy decisions (Cooley and Wandesforde-Smith, 1972). 
In administrative agencies and boards structure has been related to 
policy decisions. In a study of state water policies it was found 
membership on administrative boards that included representatives from 
business and industry was associated with weaker water quality stan-
dards, but enforcement effort was strengthened (Wenner, 1972). The 
heavily studied California Coastal Commissions which regulate coastal 
development by issuing permits show membership selected by the governor 
and legislative leaders are much more likely to deny development permits 
than local leaders who make up the balance of the commissions (Mazmanian 
and Sabatier, 1980). On utility regulation commissions, professionalism 
of the decision makers is associated with making decisions that are more 
agreeable to the public than the utilities (Berry, 1979). Clearly, 
variables such as structure, membership, and so on effect the policy 
process in executive/administrative agencies. 
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The governor is becoming an increasingly powerful institution in 
the states (Sabato, 1983). The governor is able to play a larger role 
in agenda setting, budget making, and implementation due to recent 
reforms that have taken place in most states. In particular, planning 
agencies and budgeting agencies have given the governor the pinnacle 
position in setting the agenda for the state (i.e. legislature) (Beyle 
and Muchmore, 1983; and Sabato, 1983). Looking at environmental agenda 
setting, the governors quickly responded to the public outcry of the 
early 1970's with 65.2 percent of the governors mentioning environmental 
issues in their 1970 State of the State Address and 22.7 percent specif-
ically mentioning hazardous wastes in their 1981 speeches (Beyle, 1983). 
With the governors increasing powers to set the agenda and budget, and 
effect implementation of policy, one might predict unique character-
istics of individual governors' offices may effect policy formation, 
adoption, and implementation. 
Summary 
As we have seen, the policy process is not a simple phenomena 
moving from the identification of wants to the adoption of an appropri-
ate policy response. Policies are not selected only for their ability 
to satisfy wants. Rather, demand patterns and decisional system vari-
ables intervene adding values of groups and individuals into the pro-
cess. Each component of the policy process from the socioeconomic 
variables creation of wants, to the implementation of specific programs 
has its own effect on the selection of policy, outputs, and outcomes. 
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Socioeconomic conditions, partisanship, ideology, interest groups, and 
the decisional system all play a role in determining the policies we 
adopt and implement. In the next chapter the research design will be 
developed from the literature developed in this chapter and the model of 
the policy process. 
CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY PROCESS MODEL 
Policy Process Model 
From chapters one and two we learned the policy process moves 
through the development of wants, articulation of demands, selection of 
policies by decisional system, and policy outputs. The literature 
suggests partisanship, ideology, socioeconomic conditions, and deci-
sional system characteristics determine the type of environmental poli-
cies our governmental units select. Our concept of the policy process 
and the information gathered suggests the following conceptualization of 
the determination of state environmental policy. 
Concept 
System resources, demand patterns, and decisional systems determine 
the type of environmental policies a state will have. 
Hypotheses 
State demand patterns characterized by Democratic party domination, 
ideology which sees government as a positive force, and weak interest 
group influence on the decisional system will result in strong state 
environmental policies. 
State decisional systems characterized by strong governors, profes-
sional legislatures, consolidated state environmental agencies, and are 
policy innovators will have strong state environmental policies. 
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The research design for this analysis of state environmental policy 
will be based on the above conceptualization. In this chapter working 
hypotheses will be developed from the operationalization of the concepts 
into dependent and independent variables, and a discussion of the stat-
istical analysis will be shown. 
The Working Hypotheses 
The last two statements of the operationalization provide the basis 
for developing our working hypotheses. Before proceeding into the 
working hypotheses we need to develop from the model indicators of the 
concepts that appear to be important in determining environmental pol-
icy. Partisanship, ideology, interest groups, environmental policy, and 
decisional system are complex ideas. They are not tangible items like a 
car or house. Because people differ even on the definition of these 
concepts, one cannot hope to measure ideas like ideology in total. 
Indicators are needed which are known or believed to be related to the 
particular characteristics we are trying to measure. When a person 
looks outside and notices all the water is frozen, then he knows it is 
cold outside. Frozen water, the indicator, is known to only occur in 
cold temperatures, the concept. In the following discussion, simple 
indicators for our working hypotheses will be identified. 
Socioeconomic conditions is a broad category of environmental 
conditions that includes such factors as wealth, education, race, eth-
nicity, industrialization, residence, and all other factors describing 
the social and economic conditions of a particular area. Socioeconomic 
variables lie at the start of the policy process because these are the 
factors that simulate wants. For example, high urban noise from 
20 
airplanes and highways may lead to citizens wanting noise abatement. 
The socioeconomic condition of urbanization (specifically transportation 
noise associated with urbanization), created the desire for a quieter 
environment. It is from wants that demands for action are born. The 
literature suggests income, urbanization, and education are related to 
how people view environmental issues. The U.S. Census Bureau provides 
useful indicators to measure these concepts. 
Demands are calls for a specific action to be performed by the 
government. Demand patterns are the ways in which demands are presented 
to the decisional system. Political parties, and interest groups are 
principle groups presenting demands to the decisional systems. Ideology 
is included in this section because it forms the basis of what policy 
alternatives (demands) will be supported and how. Only those altern-
ative actions that fit into one's value system will be acceptable. For 
example, a staunch conservative probably dislikes smog as much as any 
liberal, but he would still not be likely to demand policies that heav-
ily interfere with the free market. Ideology is one component which 
determines the way in which wants are converted into demands. In par-
ticular, this study will focus on one specific indicator of ideology; 
political culture. Political culture is defined as the aggregate of 
learned, socially transmitted behavior patterns characterizing govern-
ment and politics within a society (Plano, Riggs, and Robin, 1982, 
p. 100). 
Demands are presented in a wide variety of ways. Through the 
media, litigation in the judicial system, supporting candidates for 
public office, educating the public and the decision-makers, organizing 
public demonstrations, and the list goes on. Overall, the strategy is 
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to make the demand an issue and getting the issue on the decision-maker's 
agenda for consideration. This process is called agenda building; the 
process by which demands of various groups in the population are trans-
lated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials 
(Cobb, Ross, and Ross, 1976, p. 126). 
Cobb, et al (1976) describes the conditions under which issues are 
placed on the public agenda: 
(issues) 1) are the subject of widespread attention or at 
least awareness, 2) require action, in the view of a sizeable 
proportion of the public; and 3) are the appropriate concern 
of some governmental unit, in the perception of community 
members (Cobb, Ross, and Ross, 1976, p. 127). 
Government is the institutions and processes that make public policy. 
If a political party, interest group, or individual wishes to have its 
demand fulfilled, it must be placed on the government's agenda. The 
demand patterns created by demand articulators, such as interest groups, 
will determine what issues will make the government's agenda, and in 
part if and how the demands will be met. 
Consisting of the executive, judicial, and the legislative branches, 
the decisional system, through study, negotiation, bargaining, public 
opinion gathering, and a myriad of other actions, turn demand for policy 
into actual policy. The important point of the decisional system in the 
model is the decisional system is not merely a conduit through which 
demand passes through and becomes policy. Rather, the characteristics 
of the decisional system's institutions impart their own influences on 
policy adoption, output, and outcomes. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry 
Weingast stated in a study of agenda setting institutions: 
The main point of our results is that institutions impose 
constrai4tS on agenda formation and that these have systematic 
implications for outcomes under majority rule. Different sets 
of restrictions, because they imply different sets of feasible 
agendas, imply different sets of potential outcomes. Thus in 
our view the most fruitful way to proceed in the theory of 
majority voting (with an eye toward understanding legislative 
and committee institutions) is to study institutional restric-
tions on agenda formation and to show their resulting effects 
on outcomes (Sheplse and Weingast, 1984, p. 71). 
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Institutional characteristics of the decisional system such as organiza-
tion structure and customs influences the types of policies that will be 
considered and approved. Therefore, institutional characteristics of 
the decisional system will indicate the types of environmental policies 
it will adopt. 
From our discussion of the model we can develop a number of hypoth-
eses to explain differences in policy adopted by different governments 
(decision systems). The model predicts that individually socioeconomic 
variables (wants), demand patterns, and the decisional system all have 
an influence on policy output. In addition the model predicts that the 
separate components affect each other resulting in an influence that is 
greater than sum components. Therefore, a researcher might expect to 
find relationships between policy variance and each component and the 
combined effect of the components interacting. 
From the discussion several working hypotheses can be generated. 
Since it is fairly certain system resource variables produce demand for 
environmental policies, this research will focus on demand patterns and 
the decisional system while controlling for socioeconomic conditions' 
influences. Below are the working hypotheses for this research. 
HI-The type of political culture a state has is directly related to 
the scope and strength of a state's environmental policy. 
Hla-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states with a political culture which considers government 
as a positive force in solving problems. 
Hz-State partisanship is directly related to state environmental 
policy. 
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Hza-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states characterized by Democratic party dominance. 
H3-Interest group strength is directly related to state environ-
mental policy. 
H3a-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states characterized by weak interest group influence. 
H4-The type of governmental structure, operation, and tradition a 
state has is directly related to state environmental policy. 
H4a-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states which give more formal powers to the governor. 
H4b-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states with more professional legislatures. 
H4c-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states with more modernized environmental agencies. 
H4d-The scope and strength of a state's environmental policy will 
be greater in states characterized as policy innovators. 
With the working hypotheses stated, it is now time to discuss the oper-
ationalization of the variables. 
Dependent Variables 
This study will utilize indicators of policy that measure the 
scope, purpose, and degree of change in the status quo. In addition, 
rather than relying on one indicator of a state's environmental policy, 
four separate indicators of state environmental policy will be used. 
The four dependent variables are: 1) Environmental Policy Index, 
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2) Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index, 3) National Wildlife 
Federation's Toxic Substance Score, and 4) per capita spending by state 
on environmental protection. The Environmental Policy Index measures 
state initiated policies (i.e. not suggested by federal legislation), 
and the Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index measures state 
policies adopted in response to federal environmental legislation. The 
third dependent variable is a rating of toxic substance policy effort of 
the states done by the National Wildlife Federation. Per capita spend-
ing measures the amount of dollars each state spent per person on envir-
onmental protection. The unit of measure is the fifty United States of 
America's states, and all measurements are made during the years 1970-
1980. 
The first index of state environmental policy is made up of state 
policy scores in five policy areas under environmental policy. The five 
policy areas are: 1) land use control, 2) protection of critical nat-
ural resources, 3) solid waste policy, 4) hazardous waste policy, and 
5) environmental impact statement requirements. Selection of the five 
policy areas was based on the availability of data. Readers may note 
the omission of several environmental policy areas, especially water and 
air pollution areas. However, the author actually generated three 
versions of the index before settling on this particular version. The 
two versions that were not used measured state environmental policies in 
radioactive materials management and automobile inspection and mainten-
ance programs (air pollution) in place of the environmental impact 
statement requirements. Results from all three versions were similar 
with the top twenty and bottom twenty states remaining the same. There-
fore, the version with the most easily verifiable data was included. 
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Criteria and indicators for each area vary due to difficulty in obtain-
ing similar data for each policy area. Below is the formula used to 
calculate the Environmental Policy Index: 
EPI= Environmental Policy Score case 
Environmental Policy Score maximum 
Where, 
Equation (3.1) 
EPI = Environmental Policy Index 
Environmental Policy Score maximum = highest 
summation of observed values in the sample. 
Environmental Policy Score case = summation of 
observed values per unit of measure. 
Environmental Policy Scores are derived from scoring of a case's policy 
in each of the five policy areas. Appendix B lists data per state, and 
describes the criteria used to score each policy area. 
Data for state environmental policies was obtained from The Book of 
the States 1982-83, Council on Environmental Quality 1980, Annual 
Report, and from state statutes. The criteria used to measure policy 
differences for protection of critical resources, hazardous waste facil-
ity siting, and environmental impact statement legislation was the scope 
of the states' policies. Scope is defined as the number of specific re-
sources protected by state legislation in each policy area. 
In the area of protection of critical resources, a score of one was 
assigned to a state for each policy protecting nontidal wetlands, flood-
plains, agricultural lands, and endangered species. So a state with 
policies in each of the above areas could receive a score of four. It 
should be noted, all scores for the five policy areas all are adjusted 
to equal five so the scores from each policy area is weighted the same. 
Adjustments are made by converting the highest state score received to 
five and adding the same value to all other scores. 
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The scope of the state environmental impact statement legislation 
is measured by the extent of requirements for writing environmental 
impact statements. States with specia\ or limited requirements received 
a score of one half. States with comprehensive executive or administra-
tive order powers for environmental impact statements received a score 
of three quarters, and states with comprehensive statutory requirements 
for environmental impact statements received a one. As with all of the 
five policy area indicators, the maximum observed score is adjusted to 
equal five. 
Two criteria were used to measure policy differences in the land 
use planning area. First, stringency, defined as the distance or degree 
a statute changes the status quo, is measured by adoption of statewide 
land use planning laws (Rosenbaum, 1980). Statewide land use planning 
is defined as the development of a comprehensive plan detailing the 
appropriate use of all land in the state and is enforced by local gov-
ernment, state government, or jointly. All states have some form of 
state planning, but only states which regulate all state land is meas-
ured here (Morehouse, 1980). Second, the statement of purpose of state 
land use legislation is used to determine the degree.of importance 
environmental protection is given in such legislation. Data for the 
stated purpose of individual states' land use legislation was obtained 
from a survey of professional planners' evaluation of state land use 
laws performed in 1975 (Mann and Miles, 1979). States with comprehen-
sive state land used planning statutes received a score of two and a 
half with states with no statewide land use planning receiving a score 
of zero. Plus, using the scale of zero to five used by the planners' 
survey where five represents environmental protection as the most 
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important aspect of state land use laws, a score of one half was awarded 
for each point on the planners' scale. So a state that received a five 
on the planners' scale received a score of 2.5. Scores from the survey 
and adoption of statewide land use planning were added together with the 
maximum possible score being five. 
Solid waste management efforts were measured by state adoption of a 
beverage container legislation. Generally state beverage container 
laws, popularly referred to as "bottle bills," prohibit the sale of 
non-deposit beverage containers and/or consumers are required to pay a 
deposit for containers to be returned upon delivery of used beverage 
containers to stores or recycling centers (Scott and Moore, 1984). This 
type of legislation represents a drastic change from the status quo, and 
an aggressive approach to reducing waste. Therefore, "bottle bills" 
make a good indicator of state willingness to establish tough environ-
mental policies. States with beverage container legislation receive a 
score of five with states lacking beverage container legislation receiv-
ing a score of zero. 
Hazardous waste facility siting legislation is the indicator of 
state hazardous waste policy efforts. Hazardous waste facility siting 
legislation restricts the areas in which hazardous waste disposal and 
generating facilities can operate. Area restriction is based on the 
impact such a facility would have on the surrounding environment. State 
hazardous waste facility siting legislation is characterized by the 
number of natural resources that must be taken into consideration when 
evaluating the impact of siting a facility. A score of one is given for 
each different consideration a state's legislation requires. Also, a 
score of one is given to states requiring formal physical/chemical 
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studies of an area and the facility before siting is approved. Three 
natural resource considerations plus the formal physical/chemical stud-
ies adds up to a maximum possible score of four. which is adjusted to 
the weighted score of five. 
The second dependent variable measures the extent to which states 
implement federal programs encouraged by federal environmental legisla-
tion. This is an important component of a state's environmental policy 
because the bulk of our national environmental policies are designed to 
be implemented by the states (Stubbs and Cole, 1982). Through partner-
ship the national legislation expects the Environmental Protection 
Agency to establish national pollution standards, provide oversight, and 
provide technical assistance to the states. States are expected to 
issue permits to pollutors, inspect facilities, and monitor polluting 
activities (Alm, 1983). However, states must show they have the admini-
strative, financial, and statutory capability to run the programs before 
the Environmental Protection Agency will allow the states to administer 
their share of the partnership. In other words, in the absence of state 
ability, responsibility falls back on the federal government for enforce-
ment. 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 
94-580) provides a good example of the federal/state partnership in-
volved in the major national environmental legislation. The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act authorizes states to establish both solid 
waste and hazardous waste management programs. The programs are created 
to enforce standards on the disposal of our solid and hazardous wastes. 
Through the use of grant money and desire to manage their own affairs, 
states are given considerable incentive to fulfill their share of the 
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federal/state partnership. Interim authorization is given to states 
wanting to establish their own solid and hazardous waste programs. 
During the interim authorization, the Environmental Protection Agency 
monitors the state activities, and at the end of the interim period the 
Environmental Protection Agency will grant full authorization, extend 
the interim authorization or take over the responsibility for the pro-
grams. 
The federal legislation and the resulting partnerships for environ-
mental protection play an enormous role in determining the direction of 
state environmental policy. The second dependent variable, called the 
Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index consists of scores given for 
primacy (full authorization given by the federal government), and adop-
tion of pollution control programs designed to assist states in meeting 
national environmental goals. For the index, primacy was measured in 
the following areas: 1) prevention of significant deterioration regula-
tions of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 2) National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 
1972, 3) drinking water programs under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 
1977, 4) state emissions trading programs of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, and 5) state generic bubble programs of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments. See Appendix A for an explanation of the construction of 
the Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index. 
In 1979 the National Wildlife Federation performed a survey of all 
fifty states and four territories toxic substance control programs. The 
answers from the survey were converted into scores ranking the states in 
their efforts to protect the environment from toxic substances. The 
survey measured state efforts in comprehensive toxic control programs, 
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procedures for handling toxic emergencies, public participation in toxic 
substance control, state assumption of the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System, controlling disposal of unused pesticides, recycling 
of waste oil, prevention of toxic water pollution, monitoring of surface 
and ground water, ground water protection, hazardous waste management, 
identification of toxic content of hazardous wastes, and controls on 
abandoned dump sites (Segal et al, 1980). The results of the National 
Wildlife Federation's survey represents a more compr~hensive evaluation 
of state environmental policy than this author had either the resources 
or expertise to perform. Although it measures state policy only in 
controlling toxic substance pollution, its quality of results makes it a 
valuable measure of state environmental policy for this analysis. See 
Appendix B for individual state scores. 
The last dependent variable utilized in this analysis of the deter-
minants of state environmental policy is state per capita spending on 
environmental protection. Data on state environmental protection expen-
ditures is compiled by the United States Census Bureau. Already the 
weakness of expenditure data as a measure of policy has been discussed, 
but environmental policy implementation is not exempt from the need for 
money. In part, the ability to enforce regulations and monitor pollu-
tion is dependent on dollars to acquire the staff and tools needed. In 
addition, the ability to win Environmental Protection Agency approval to 
implement federal programs is heavily dependent on the states' willing-
ness to finance the programs. Therefore, combined with the other depen-
dent variables, per capita spending increases the potential for relia-
bility and validity to measure environmental policy. 
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Independent Variables 
Seven independent variables will be used to measure characteristics 
of the demand pattern and decisional system in our model. Three vari-
ables measure characteristics of the demand patterns present in each 
state. They are Daniel Elazar's (1972) state classification of politi-
cal culture, A. Ranney's (1971) partisanship scale, and Sarah M. 
Morehouse's (1981) classification of interest group strength. Indica-
tors of decisional system characteristics are Nelson Dometrius's (1979) 
index of gubernatorial strength, my own index of legislative profes-
sionalism, the structural organization of states' primary environmental 
protection agency(ies), and Jack Walker's (1969) state innovation. The 
selection of these independent variables are based on the timeliness of 
the indicators, availability of alternative measures, and quality. 
The measures of interest group strength and political culture were-
selected because they represented the only quantitative attempts to 
measure those concepts. Ranney's measure of the degree of Democratic 
party control in the states is a popularly used indicator of partisan-
ship, and represents one of the most thorough measures with its consid-
eration of five partisanship factors. Demetrius's measure of governor's 
strength is similar to Schlesienger's landmark attempt at measuring 
governors' strength; however, it measures strength during the decade 
under consideration. Measures of legislative professionalism tend to be 
dated which led to the creation of my own index of legislative profes-
sionalism (LPI). The Legislative Professionalism Index is based on 
previous measures of legislative professionalism with one exception, the 
addition of measuring the uses of electronic data processing in the 
state legislatures. Finally, the use of Walker's measure of state 
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innovation and the-classification of state environmental agencies struc-
tures was based on the lack of other appropriate measures. 
Political culture should have the effect of determining the types 
of policies that are acceptable to the mass public and the political 
elite. States with varying cultures will have different sets of accept-
able policies to choose from. For this reason measuring culture should 
give us a good indicator of the type of environmental policies a state 
will adopt. Elazar (1972) measuring differences in the types of poli-
cies states adopt developed a classification system of state political 
culture. He identified eight distinctive types of political culture; 
they are 
1. Moralistic, society sees government as a positive force in 
solving societies problems. 
2. Individualistic, society believes individuals should solve 
their own problems. 
3. Traditionalistic, believes in a limited government role in 
society based on essentially maintaining the status quo. 
4. Moralistic-individualistic, emphasis is on moralism. 
5. Individualistic-Traditionalistic, emphasis is on individual-
istic culture. 
6. Individualistic-Moralistic, emphasis is on individualism. 
7. Traditionalistic-Individualistic, emphasis is on traditional-
ism. 
8. Traditionalistic-Moralistic, emphasis on traditionalism. 
See Table I for classification of the states' political culture in 
Chapter 3. 
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Partisanship is measured by the Ranney index which is composed of 
1. The average percentage of the popular vote won by the Demo-
cratic gubernatorial candidate. 
2. The average percentage of the seats in the state senate held by 
the Democrats. 
3. The average percentage of the seats in the state house of 
representatives held by the Democrats. 
4. The percentage of all terms for governor, senate, and house in 
which Democrats had control (Ranney, 1971). 
The index is measured from 1972-1979. In essence Ranney constructed an 
index of party competitiveness where an average of the four components 
equal to one would represent a perfect Democratic state. An average of 
one half represents a highly competitive party state. 
Interest group strength is the last measure of state demand pat-
terns. Through extensive review of state literature, Sarah M. Morehouse 
(1981) rated states' interest group strength as either strong, moderate, 
or weak. Although Morehouse admits this attempt to rate interest group 
strength is tentative, it still represents one of the only fifty state 
measure of interest group strength. Table VIII in Appendix B gives the 
individual state scores for the three demand pattern variables. 
Developing measures to accurately reflect institutional character-
istics of our political institutions is not an easy task. At the center 
of the problem is a lack of information concerning the operation of 
state and local governments, and the myriad of rules, interactions, 
traditions, structures, and procedures that make up decisional charac-
teristics. Even with quality information on such factors, determining 
the institutional characteristics to measure is filled with uncertainty. 
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However, these barriers have not stopped political scientists from 
developing indicators of decisional system characteristics. In addi-
tion, several applications of various measures have given moderate 
support to the reliability and validity of such measures (Hedlund, 
1984). 
The index developed by Dometrius (1979) combined appointive powers, 
budget making powers, and line item veto power into an index of guber-
natorial strength. Using data from 1970-1980, the index weights the 
three factors the same. Dometrius felt such factors as tenure potential 
used by other researchers did not have a significant relationship to 
actual studies of governors (Dometrius, 1979). This index measures only 
formal powers of the governor. 
Past efforts of measuring legislative professionalism have proved 
to be of limited success in predicting policy variance. Legislative 
professionalism is defined below. 
By professional we mean that in some legislatures the members 
are well-paid and tend to think of their jobs as full-time 
ones; members and committees are well staffed and have good 
informational services available to them; and a variety of 
legislative services, such as bill drafting and statutory 
revision, are well supported and maintained. In other legis-
latures, members are poorly paid and regard their legislative 
work as part time; there is little in the way of staff for 
legislators or committees; and little or nothing provided in 
the way of legislative assistance and services (Dye, 1977, 
p. 136). 
In particular, John Grumm's (1970) index which measured salary, length 
of session, number of bills introduced, and staff services has been 
successful with several updates and minor changes to the index's struc-
ture having been made. Unfortunately, most indices of legislative 
professionalism are dated. Therefore, using the basic assumptions of 
past modelers of legislative professionalism I have created an index 
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with data from 1970-1980. Measuring the average salary of state legis-
lators, average turnover percentage, average number of permanent staff 
services provided, and average number of electronic data processing 
applications (measured only from 1976 to 1980) the index combines these 
factors into a single index of legislative professionalism. See Appen-
dix A for the construction of the Legislative Professionalism Index. 
Agency modernization is measured by classifying agency organiza-
tional structure. With the emphasis on environmental policy, growing 
states are finding that the old public health, agriculture, resource 
development, and wildlife and parks agencies are not designed to imple-
ment the environmental protection policies being demanded. Although 
strong arguments can be made for professionalism of state staffs, staff 
size, and so on as more influential on policy, little data exists to 
measure these factors. Classifications of state environmental agencies 
do exist. Using the Book ~f_!h~~tate~~~2-?J, state environmental 
agencies are classified into 
1. Health department connected. 
2. Natural resources superagencies (includes both development and 
protection functions). 
3. Little environmental protection agencies (modeled from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency). 
4. Various unconsolidated agency structures. From these we are 
able to develop a nominal level independent variable for agency modern-
ization. 
Finally, state innovation is the last independent variable. State 
innovation as measured by Ronald Savage (1978) is used as an independent 
variable because of its success in predicting policy variance. In 
general, innovative states have been found to have more liberal welfare 
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policies and higher socioeconomic levels (Walker, 1969). Savage updates 
Jack L. Walker's (1969) measure of state innovation by including more 
policy subject areas and looking at state adoptions up to 1977 (Savage, 
1978). Innovation is defined as " a program or a policy that is 
new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or 
how many states have adopted it (Walker, 1969, p. 881)". Table II in 
Appendix B provides state by state scores for each decisional system 
independent variable. 
The measure of state innovation provides a good measure of the 
system resources within a state. As previously mentioned, the measure 
of state innovativeness is strongly associated with higher socioeconomic 
levels including high urbanization, income, education, and industriali-
zation (Savage, 1978). For this reason our measure of state innovation 
will be used to indicate the effects of system resources on the determ-
ination of state environmental policy. In this analysis system re-
sources refers to urbanization, industrialization, income, and educa-
tion. 
S~atis!ical Analysis 
Two types of analysis will be used in measuring the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables: bivariate crosstabula-
tion analysis and multivariate regression analysis. In both cases 
measures of association will be used to determine the direction and 
strength of relationships and tests of significance will be utilized to 
determine the probability of the observed relationships occurring by 
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chance. Each dependent variable is measured at the interval level and 
the independent variables political culture and agency modernization are 
measured at the nominal level. Therefore, the measure of association to 
be used in the analysis between the dependent variables and the nominal 
independent variables is ~ coefficient, which is the appropriate 
measure of association between interval level dependent variables and 
nominal level independent variables (Andrews, et al, 1981; and Norusis, 
1983). All other independent variables are measured at the interval 
level, and will be analyzed with multivariate regression analysis. 
Tests of significance for the crosstabulation analysis will be chi 
square and F for the regression analysis. For all cases alpha will be 
set at .05. 
There will be two equations for each of the four dependent vari-
ables resulting in eight regression models. The purpose of dividing the 
Legression analysis into two equations for each model is to ensure an 
adequate case-to-variable ratio of approximately sixteen cases for each 
independent variable (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983). The two equations 
for each dependent variable are divided by two components of the policy 
process model; demand pattern variables and decisional system variables. 
The state innovativeness measure will be included in each equation as a 
control for system resources. Below are the regression models we want 
to fit: 
Ys a + .xi + .xp + .xh Equation (3.2) 
Ys = a + .xi + .xp + .xh Equation (3.3) 
Ys = a + .xg + .xl + .xh Equation (3.4) 
Yf a + .xg + .xl + .xh Equation (3.5) 
Yd a + .xi + .xp + .xh Equation (3.6) 
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Yd = a + .xg + .xl + .xh Equation (3.7) 
Yn = a + .xi + .xp + .xh Equation (3.8) 
Yn + a + .xg + .xl + .xh Equation (3.9) 
Where, Ys dependent variable, Environmental Policy Index 
Yf dependent variable, Federal Environmental Policy 
Adoption Index 
Yd = dependent variable, per capita spending 
Yn = dependent variable, National Wildlife Federation's 
Toxic Substance Score 
xi interest group strength indicator 
xp partisanship indicator 
xg gubernatorial strength indicator 
xl legislative professionalism indicator 
xh state innovativeness indicator 
a intercept 
b slope, regression correlation coefficient 
Examination of residuals will determine if the minimum assumptions for 
use of regression analysis are met by the data. The assumptions are 
1. The relationships between the dependent and independent vari-
ables is linear. 
2. The data is normally distributed. 
3. The independent variables are not highly correlated to each 
other (Tabachnick and Fidel!, 1983). 
Summary 
Using a model of the policy process, four hypotheses are developed 
to predict differences in state environmental policy which can be ex-
plained by the characteristics of state demand patterns, system resources, 
and decisional systems. The indicator of system resources is state innova-
tion scores. Measures of partisanship, interest group strength, and 
political culture are used to indicate demand pattern characteristics. 
Legislative professionalism, gubernatorial strength, and state innova-
tion measures provide indicators of decisional system factors. Four 
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dependent variables are used to measure the scope and strength of state 
environmental policy for the years 1970-1980. They are the Environ-
mental Policy Index, the Federal Environmental P~licy Adoption Index, 
state per capita spending on environmental protection, and the National 
Wildlife Federation's Toxic Substance Control Score. The unit of anal-
ysis is the fifty states. Bivariate crosstabulation analysis will be 
used to measure the association between the interval level dependent 
variables and the nominal level independent variables, while multivar-
iate regression analysis will be used to measure association between the 
dependent variables and the rest of the independent variables. The null 
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hypothesis will be rejected at alpha level .05. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
The central hypothesis predicts socioeconomic, demand pattern, and 
decisional system variables determine state environmental policy out-
puts. Due to the nature of the measures, both bivariate crosstabulation 
and multiple regression analysis is used to measure the association 
between the dependent variables and independent variables. The results 
will be presented in three parts: 1) results of the bivariate analysis, 
2) evaluation of the residuals for the dependent and independent vari-
ables, and 3) results of the multivariate regression analysis. 
Bivariate Analysis 
In this analysis a bivariate crosstabulation analysis of eta was 
performed on the dependent variables Environmental Policy Index, Federal 
Environmental Adoption Index, per capita spending on environmental 
protection, and the National Wildlife Federation's Toxic Substance 
Control Score to the independent variables of political culture and 
agency consolidation. Eta squared, known as the correlation ratio, is 
the amount of variance in the dependent variable explained by the inde-
pendent variable (Nie et al, 1975). The results from the analysis are 




BIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Variables Eta2 Chi square sig. 
Environmental Policy Index 
with political culture 
Environmental Policy Index 
with agency consolidation 
Fed. Env. Policy Adoption 
Index with political culture 
Fed. Env. Policy Adoption 
Index with agency consolidation 
Per capita spending with 
political culture 
Per capita spending with 
agency consolidation 
Nat'l Wildlife Federation's 
Toxic Substance Score with 
political culture 
Nat'l Wildlife Federation's 
Toxic Substance Score with 
agency consolidation 









The correlation ratios indicate the independent variables, polit-
ical culture and agency consolidation, explain very little variance in 
the dependent variables. The strongest relationships were found between 
political culture and the dependent variables Federal Environmental 
Policy Adoption Index and per capita spending, at .26 and .29 ratios 
respectfully. The correlation ratios for the other variables were all 
weak falling below .20 level of association. The null hypothesis that 
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political culture and agency consolidation are not directly related to 
the scope and strength of state environmental policy must be accepted at 
alpha level .05. The probability of the above relationships occurring 
in the population is not significantly greater than chance. 
Examination of Residuals 
The purpose of this section is to ensure the relationships between 
the dependent variables and independent variables meet the assumptions 
of multiple regression analysis. The assumptions, as stated in Chapter 
III, are 
1. The relationship between the dependent and independent vari-
ables is linear. 
2. The data is normally distributed. 
3. The independent variables are not highly correlated. 
Examination of residuals, the difference between the observed 
values and the predicted values, for the independent variables plotted 
against the residuals for the dependent variables determines if assump-
tions one and two are met. Pearson product-moment correlation coeffi-
cients for the independent variables will be used to indicate the statis-
tical independence of the independent variables. 
Scattergrams of the residuals for each of the regression models can 
be found in Appendix C. The assumption that the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables is linear appears to be con-
firmed by the scattergrams, since the plots of the residuals show negli-
gible curvature. In addition, the distribution of the data seems normal 
with the exception of a few outliers. Overall, the scattergraphs indi-
cate no significant deviations from assumptions one and two. 
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In Table II Pearson correlation coefficients suggests the indepen-
dent variables meet assumption three. The strongest correlation occurs 
between interest group strength and state innovation with a coefficient 
of .37. It is not sufficiently large enough to damage the regression 
equation since it is not highly correlated (near singutar correlation) 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983). As can be seen, the rest of the coeffic-
ients are sufficiently small to meet assumption three. 
TABLE II 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 




























The results from the multivariate regression analysis is presented 
in Table III and IV. In Table III we can see a moderate fit between the 
regression line and the data points, as indicated by the multiple corre-
lation coefficient (R) for each regression model with the exception of 
Equation 3.5. Equation 3.5 measures the association between the depen-
dent variable, Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index, and the 
independent variables state innovation, gubernatorial strength, and 
legislative professionalism. The coefficient of determination (R 
squared) explains the amount of variance determined by the independent 
variables. With coefficients of determination ranging from .22 for 
Equation 3.8 down to .05 for Equation 3.5, the models explain only a 
moderate proportion of the variance occurring in the dependent vari-
ables. 
TABLE III 
SELECTED STATISTICS FROM MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
Equation R R2 Significance F 
2.2 .45 • 20 .02 
2.3 .42 .18 .04 
2.4 .43 .18 .03 
2.5 .22 .05 .54 
2.6 .41 .17 .04 
















The null hypothesis for Equations 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.6, and 3.8 is 
rejected at alpha level .05. The null hypotheses that the decisional 
system characteristics, gubernatorial strength and legislative profes-
sionalism, is not directly associated with state environmental policy, 
as measured by the Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index, per 
capita spending, and the National Wildlife Federation's Toxic Substance 
Score, must be accepted at alpha level .05. The measures of association 
between the dependent variables and the demand pattern variables can be 
accepted as not occurring by chance. 
Table IV lists the standardized partial regression coefficients 
(Beta) for the eight regression models. The standardized partial regres-
sion coefficient indicates the amount of influence of individual inde-
pendent variables on the dependent variable controlling for the effects 
of the other independent variables. The results indicate state innova-
tion and partisanship are most strongly associated with state environ-
mental policy. The Betas for the other independent variables suggests 
they are only weakly associated with the dependent variables. 
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Partisanship is found to be moderately associated with the Federal Environmental 
Policy Adoption Index and the National Wildlife Federation's Toxic 
Substance Control Score having coefficients of .46 and .37. State 
innovation is moderately associated with the Environmental Policy Index, 
per capita spending, and the National Wildlife Federation's Toxic Sub-
stance Control Score. 
TABLE IV 
STANDARDIZED PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
Dependent Variable (equation): 
Independent Variables 
Environmental Policy Index (3.2) 
Partisanship 
Interest group strength 
State innovation 




Federal Environmental Policy Index (3.4) 
Partisanship 
Interest group strength 
State innovation 




Per capita spending (3.6) 
Partisanship 
Interest group strength 
State innovation 
Per capita spending (3.7) 
Gubernatorial strength 
Beta Significance T 








.06 • 70 
.04 .81 





-.04 • 76 
TABLE IV 
(Continued) 




National Wildlife Federation's 
Toxic Substance Control Score (3.8) 
Partisanship 
Interest group strength 
State innovation 
National Wildlife Federation's 
























The null hypothesis that state environmental policy is not directly 
related to state innovation is rejected by regression models 3.2, 3.3, 
3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 at alpha level .05. In addition, the null hypothesis 
that state environmental policy is not directly related to partisanship 
is rejected by Equations 3.4 and 3.8. For all other hypotheses the null 
hypothesis is accepted. 
Summary 
With the exception of state innovation and partisanship all the 
independent variables were only weakly associated with the dependent 
variables. Plus, state innovation and partisanship were the only 
48 
individual variables which were significantly related enough to reject 
the null hypothesis. Overall, the central hypothesis receives only one 
weak support from the bivariate and multivariate analysis. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings provide only mixed support for the hypotheses we were 
testing. Only state innovation and partisanship appeared to have any 
important influence on the scope and strength of state environmental 
policy. Only one of the decisional system variables showed a moderate 
association with the dependent variables. This chapter will examine the 
findings, and try to determine why the predictions we made concerning 
the determinants of state environmental policy were not all supported by 
the analysis. In particular, we will examine the results for each of 
the three components of the policy model: 1) system resources, 2) de-
mand patterns, and 3) decisional system. 
System Resources 
The measure of state innovation provided our indicator of the 
system resources; education, income, industrialization, and urbaniza-
tion. From the model we predicted system resources or socioeconomic 
conditions created the wants which lead to demand for public policies. 
In other words, a problem needs to exist before people will feel a need 
to address the problem. The literature suggested increasing education, 
income, industrialization, and urbanization all result in more concern 
for the environment. Environmentally concerned people presumably would 
want strong action taken to alleviate environmental degradation. 
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The findings confirm our prediction that state innovation is di-
rectly related to the scope and strength of state environmental policy. 
However, one excepti~ does exist. The Federal Environmental Policy 
Adoption Index was not highly related to state innovation. This would 
indicate the processes involved in states adopting federal environmental 
programs is different from the adoption of other types of state environ-
mental policies. Perhaps the Federal Environmental Policy Adoption 
Index incorrectly measures state adoption of federal programs. Examin-
ation of the data reveals a different explanation. Comparing the values 
for the states' Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index values and 
state innovation values we see southern states tend to score very highly 
on the federal adoption index, while receiving low values on the state 
innovation index. Further analysis, which removes the southern states 
from the cases, may suggest that Federal Environmental Policy Adoption 
Index is influenced by state system resources. There may be an inter-
vening variable, which enables southern states to achieve Environmental 
Protection Agency approval to implement federal programs. For example, 
The EPA Region IV, which encompasses the southern states, may be excep-
tionally good at providing the technical advice in winning EPA approval 
or exceptionally lax in overseeing and evaluating state efforts to 
receive approval. In all, the results definitely lead us to accept 
state innovation as a determinant of state environmental policy. 
Demand Patterns 
Partisanship proved to be the only demand pattern variable that is 
a determinant of state environmental policy in this analysis. Both 
political culture and interest group strength showed only weak measures 
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of association with the four dependent variables. One reason for these 
results might be the nature of the indicators used in the analysis. The 
Ranney index measuring the degree of Democratic party control in the 
states is based on five factors that are relatively easy to define and 
measure. The measures of political culture and interest group strength 
are based on hard to define concepts that employ subjective measure. 
Although the creators of both these measures did excellent work, the 
concepts political culture and interest group strength are simply diffi-
cult to define and measure. One reason for the low measure of associ-
ation may have been from the indicators' inability to measure the con-
cepts we desired. Also, political culture may be overridden by other 
factors such as fear of ecocatastrophe. For example, a conservative 
public may be ideologically opposed to environmental regulation, but, 
nevertheless, support stringent regulation if they forsee an eminent 
threat to their lives or livelihoods. 
Although the results suggest partisanship is a determinant of 
federal environmental policy adoption and toxic substance control ef-
forts by the states, partisanship failed to be highly associated with 
either the Environmental Policy Index or per capita spending on environ-
mental protection. Once again observations from the southern states may 
be uncharacteristic, which results in the lack of association between 
partisanship and state initiated policies and per capita spending. 
Examining the data in Appendix B we can see the southern states, 
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky are one-party Democratic states. 
However, these states are traditionally more conservative (Lester, 
1980). This conservative tradition can be seen in the types of political 
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cultures the southern states exhibit. The southern states do not adopt 
many of the policies and positions supported by the Democratic party, 
even though, the Democratic party is the most dominant in the southern 
states. Removing these units from the data set may lead to stronger 
associations between partisanship and out dependent variables. 
The Decisional System 
The analysis did not support the prediction that decisional system 
variables would be important determinants of state environmental policy. 
No relationships were found between the decisional system variables and 
the four dependent variables with the exception of state innovation. 
Could it be the decisional system is not an important determinant of 
policy outputs? Certainly, this analysis, as well as other research, 
supports this conclusion (Dye, 1979). One explanation, however, is 
worth considering. Simply, our attempts to measure the institutional 
characteristics of the decisional system is crude and incomplete. The 
measure of gubernatorial strength indicates only the formal powers the 
governor possesses. Informal powers may be more important than formal 
powers. The legislative professionalism index measures only the concept 
of professionalism when tradition, rules, or leadership may be important 
determinants of the types of policy state legislatures adopt. In short, 
better measures should provide us with more valid results that may 
indicate a stronger correlation between decisional system variables and 
environmental policy output. 
State innovation, as already reported, was found to be a determ-
inant of state environmental policy. State innovation not only served 
as an indicator of system resources characteristics, but also, served as 
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an indicator of state decisional systems characteristics to adopt new 
policies. The analysis is clear innovative states are innovative in 
adopting environmental policies. Since moderate associations have been 
found between legislative professionalism and gubernatorial strength by 
other researchers, we can conclude there may be some relationship be-
tween the decisional system and state environmental policy. 
Furthermore, the policy process is one characterized by interaction 
between system resources, demand patterns, the decisional system, and 
policy outputs. The interplay between the various policy process com-
ponents would appear to be an important determinant of policy outputs. 
This interaction in the policy process is not considered in this anal-
ysis, rather, each component is treated as a separate independently 
acting determinant. A more sophisticated analysis, considering the 
interactions between variables, may be required to find any substantial 
influences produced by the decisional system. 
Summary 
Each component of the policy process model utilized in this analy-
sis showed measurable association with one or more of the four dependent 
variables. This supports our central hypothesis that system resources, 
demand patterns, and decisional system characteristics have a direct 
relationship with the scope and strength of state environmental policy. 
However, the Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index dependent 
variable produced results that were not predicted due to high scores 
received for the Federal Environmental Policy Index. The southern 
states scores may reflect an intervening variable characteristic only in 
the southern states. In addition, several variables measuring demand 
pattern and decisional system factors did not exhibit any substantial 
relationship with the dependent variables. Specifically, political 
culture, interest group strength, legislative professionalism, and 
gubernatorial strength were found to have only very weak measures of 
association with the dependent variables. 
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State environmental policy adoption provides us with a unique 
laboratory to test our public policy theories. This analysis has been 
an effort to expand our knowledge of the policy process. Further re-
search is needed before any definite conclusions can be made concerning 
the state environmental policy process. However, it is hoped this 
analysis will be a contribution towards the understanding of the policy 
process. 
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CONSTRUCTION OF INDICES 
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Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index 
1) The Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index (FEPAI) consists of 
five components: 1) responsibility for administering the Preven-
tion of Significant Deterioration program (PSD); 2) responsibility 
for administering the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES); 3) responsibility for administering safe drinking 
water programs; 4) establishment of state air emissions trading 
programs; and 5) establishment of state generic bubble programs. 
2. Each component is scored by state and measures achievement for each 
component to the year 1981. The score for each component is three; 
however, the criteria for assigning scores varies for each component. 
Below are the scoring systems for each component. 




Working towards assuming responsibility-1.5 
No responsibility-! 




Drinking water programs: States received scores for the following 
characteristics: 
Full responsibility-3 
Returned responsibility to EPA-2 
No responsibility-! 
State air emissions trading programs: States received scores for 
the following characteristics: 
EPA approved program-3 
Under review of EPA-2 
Under consideration by state-! 
State generic bubble programs: States received scores for the 
following characteristics: 
EPA approved program-3 
Proposed for approval-2.5 
Under review by EPA-2 
Under development-! 
3. Score for each component are summed together to arrive at the 
FEPAI. See Equation 3.3 below. 
FEPAI = PSD score + NPDES score + 
Drinking water score + 
Emissions trading score + 
Bubble program score 
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Legislative Professionalism Index 
1. The Legislative Professionalism Index (LPI) consists of four com-
ponents: 1) average year!~ compensation received by legislators 
between 1970-80 by state; 2) average percentage of turnover in 
legislative membership in house and senate by state for the years 
1970-80; 3) average number of permanent legislative services pro-
vided to the legislature by state for the years 197Q-80; and 
4) average number of electronic data processing applications used 
by state legislatures for the years 1976-80. Each component car-
ries the same value of one. 
2. Each states' average for each component is divided by the maximum 
average received in the sample cases and the quotients are added 
together to form the LPI. Below is the equation for the LPI. 
EPI = Cxi + Txi + Sxi + Exi 
Cyi + Tyi + Syi + Eyi 
Where: Cxi = Average yearly compensation of case i. 
Txi = Average yearly turnover of case i. 
Sxi = Average number of legislative services 
case i. 
Exi = Average number of electronic data 
processing applications in case i. 
Cyi = Maximum average compensation received. 
Tyi = Maximum average turnover received. 
Syi = Maximum average number of services. 
received. 
of 
Eyi = Maximum average number of electronic data 
processing applications received. 







MEASURES OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
State EPI Per Capita FEPAI NWFTS 
AL 0.281 1.27 10.0 22.0 
AK 0.575 22.81 5.5 17.0 
AZ 0.624 2.45 6.5 5.5 
AR 0.560 1.51 7.0 21.5 
CA 0.917 4.55 8.0 34.0 
co 0.428 4.01 8.0 15.5 
,CT 0.917 9.34 10.0 26.5 
DE 1.00 11.34 9.0 28.5 
FL 0.526 2.12 6.5 25.5 
GA 0.611 2.04 11.0 11.0 
HI 0.599 8.92 7.0 17.0 
ID 0.306 4.35 5.0 12.0 
IL 0.403 5.82 11.0 23.0 
IN 0.482 2.71 9.0 20.0 
IA 0.844 2.61 7.0 17.5 
KS 0.428 1.53 7.0 17.5 
KY 0.452 2.67 11.5 15.5 
LA 0.550 1.13 8.5 23.0 
ME 0.892 8.37 7.0 13.0 
MD o. 770 8.96 9.0 32.0 
MA 0.746 7.69 8.0 18.5 
MI 0.929 5.29 10.0 19 .o 
MN 0.780 4.89 9.0 18.0 
~-~s 0.281 2.06 9.0 13.0 
MO 0.355 2.82 9.0 16.0 
MT 0.428 4.63 8.5 19 .o 
NE 0.672 3.60 7.0 16.0 
NV 0.428 4.15 7.0 10.0 
NH 0.355 14.79 5.0 10.5 
NJ 0.513 5.77 ' 8.0 24.5 
NM 0.330 3.38 6.5 18.0 
NY o. 731 7.87 7.0 23.5 
NC 0.403 2.94 11.5 24.0 
ND 0.306 1.55 11.0 18.0 
OH 0.609 17.73 9.0 25.5 
OK 0.379 1.59 7.5 22.0 
OR 0.976 5.90 12.0 27.0 
PA 0.658 4.08 9.5 23.5 
RI 0.902 7.96 11.0 20.0 
sc 0.428 2.32 12.0 29.5 
SD 0.452 2.01 3.0 9.0 
TN 0.609 2.77 10.0 30.5 
TX 0.367 1.65 6.5 24.5 
UT 0.342 1.59 6.-5 17.5 
TABLE V 
(Continued) 
State EPI Per Capita FEPAI NWFTS 
VT 0.844 11.51 9.0 25.5 
VA 0.452 2.98 10.0 21.0 
WA 0.758 5.44 11.0 29.0 
wv 0.379 2.73 7.5 14.0 
WI 0.550 1.28 9.5 18.5 
WY 0.378 3.02 7.0 20.5 
EPI = Environmental Policy Index, 1970-80. 
Per capita spending = average amount spent on environmental pro-
tection from 1970 to 1980. 
FEPAI = Federal Environmental Policy Adoption Index 




FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ADOPTION INDEX 
State PSD NPDES Drinking Emissions Bubble 
Water Trading Program 
AL 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 
AK 1.5 1.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
AZ 2.5 1.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
AR 3.0 1.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
CA 1.0 3.0 3.0 o.o 1.0 
co 1.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 o.o 
CT 1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 
DE 3.0 3.0 • 3.0 0.0 o.o 
FL 2.5 1.0 3.0 o.o 0.0 
GA 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o 2.0 
HI 1.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
ID 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
IL 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o 2.0 
IN 3.0 3.0 1.0 o.o 2.0 
IA 2.0 3.0 2.0 o.o o.o 
KS 1.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
KY 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.5' 
LA 2.5 1.0 3.0 0.0 2.0 
ME 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
MS 2.0 3.0 3.0 o.o 1.0 
MA 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 
MI 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 
MN 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
MA 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
MO 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
MT 2.5 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
NE 1.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
NV 1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
NH 1.0 1.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
NJ 1.0 1.0 3.0 o.o 3.0 
NM 2.5 1.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
NY 1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 o.-
NC 2.5 3.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
ND 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 
OH 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o o.o 
OK 2.5 1.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 
OR 2.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 
PA 2.5 3.0 1.0 o.o 3.0 
RI 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
sc 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o 3.0 
SD 1.0 1.0 1.0 o.o 0.0 
TN 3.0 3.0 3.0 o.o 1.0 
TX 2.5 1.0 3.0 0.0 o.o 
State PSD NPDES 
UT 2.5 1.0 
VT 3.0 3.0 
VA 3.0 3.0 
WA 1.0 3.0 
wv 2.5 2.0 
WI 2.5 3.0 































Source for PSD, NPDES, and Drinking Water programs: Stubbs, Anne and 
Leslie Cole. "Environment Management." Book of the States 1982-83. 
Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 1981; 587-614. 
Source for Emissions Trading and Bubble Programs: Council on Environ-
mentalQuality. Environmental guality Annual Report 1983. Washington 
D.C., 1983; 190. 
69 
TABLE VII 
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM INDEX 
State Compen- Membership Number of Electronic 
sat ion Turnover % Services Data Processing 
AL 13227 63 18 3 
AK 33187 49 19 8 
AZ 15737 28 29 2 
AR 7055 21 14 0 
CA 57044 28 30 7 
co 16000 37 18 8 
CT 10750 39 22 9 
DE 16537 32 9 2 
FL 29050 36 27 14 
GA 15971 26 17 8 
HI 27450 36 31 2 
ID 8598 31 10 4 
IL 40006 26 41 11 
IN 19292 32 18 8 
IA 18041 38 20 16 
KS 14060 32 18 8 
KY 13412 31 13 7 
LA 20875 43 25 6 
ME 5014 41 16 3 
MD 20075 41 17 11 
MA 29889 41 38 4 
MI 38625 23 28 7 
MN 20850 33 42 11 
MS 19537 39 25 6 
MO 17287 28 18 2 
MT 6799 41 19 8 
NE 9800 30 16 8 
NV 7230 39 15 6 
NH 200 42 16 3 
NJ 20000 41 20 6 
.NM 3060 25 14 4 
NY 45350 26 48 9 
NC 14048 35 36 7 
ND 5997 33 14 7 
OH 30875 22 22 12 
OK 20214 25 15 5 
OR 17568 34 21 9 
PA 30960 24 45 12 
RI 600 31 22 8 
sc 13075 35 23 3 
::>D 6087 35 18 11 
TN 17755 29 25 2 




State Compen- Membership Number of Electronic 
sat ion Turnover % Services Data Processing 
UT 3200 39 14 
VT 6952 32 12 
VA 16560 23 23 
WA 14930 43 27 
wv 8257 43 18 
WI 27098 25 34 
WY 2903 38 12 
Source: Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. 











MEASURES OF STATE DEMAND PATTERNS 
State Political Partisanship Interest Group 
Culture Strength 
AL 7 .9438 1 
AK 4 .5571 1 
AZ 8 .4482 2 
AR 7 .8630 1 
CA 2 .7081 2 
co 1 .4429 3 
CT 3 .7336 3 
DE 4 .5490 2 
FL 6 .7524 1 
GA 7 .8849 1 
HI 5 .7547 1 
ID 2 .3898 2 
IL 4 .5384 2 
IN 4 .4145 2 
IA 2 .4539 1 
KS 2 .4671 2 
KY 3 .7907 1 
LA 7 .8762 .L 
ME 1 .5164 2 
MD 4 .8509 2 
MA 3 .7916 3 
MI 1 .6125 3 
MN 1 .6680 3 
MS 7 .8673 1 
MO 5 .6932 2 
MT 2 .6259 1 
NE 3 .5166 1 
NV 4 .7593 2 
NH 2 .3916 1 
NJ 4 .7330 3 
NM 6 • 7113 1 
NY 3 .5390 3 
NC 8 .8555 1 
ND 1 .3374 3 
OH 4 .5916 2 
OK 6 .7841 1 
OR 1 .6954 1 
PA 4 .5574 2 
RI 3 .8506 3 
sc 7 .8034 1 
SD 2 .3512 2 
TN 7 .6648 1 
TX 6 .7993 1 


























• 3879 2 
Political culture scores from: Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: 
A View from the States, 2nd edition. New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell, 1972. 
Partisanship scores from: Patterson, Samuel. "Legislators and 
Legislatures in the American States." Politics in the 
American States 4th edition. Eds. Virginia Gray, Herbert 
Jacob, and Kenneth Vines. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1984. 
Interest group scores from: Morehouse, Sarah M. State Politics, 




!-Moralistic 2-Moralistic-Individualistic 3-Individualistic-Moralistic 
4-Individualistic 5-Individualistic-Traditionalistic 6-Traditionalisti-
Individualistic ]-Traditionalistic 8-Traditionalistic-Moralistic 
Partisanship: 
1.00-Complete Democratic party control 
0.50-Party control split evenly between Republicans and Democrats 
0.00-Complete Republican control 






MEASURES OF DECISIONAL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
State IVl IV2 IV3 IV4 
AL 2.503 1.13 3 .67 
AK 2.431 1.91 3 0.00 
AZ 2.295 1.75 1 .77 
AR 1.819 1.42 2 1.02 
CA 2.524 2.81 4 1.41 
co 2.425 1. 72 1 1.29 
CT 2.494 1. 75 3 1.27 
DE 2.458 2.81 4 .73 
FL 1. 296 2.53 3 1.13 
GA 2.367 1.94 3 .62 
HI 2.698 1.84 1 o.oo 
ID 1.437 1.29 1 1.51 
IL 2.568 3.05 2 1.29 
IN 1.610 1.87 1 1.32 
IA 2.222 2. 29 2 1.07 
KS 2.354 1. 76 1 .84 
KY 2.535 1.62 3 .97 
LA 2.418 1.75 3 .91 
ME 1.440 1.12 2 1.33 
MD 1.527 1.91 1 1.27 
MA 1.610 2.08 3 1.21 
MI 2.411 2.61 3 1.29 
MN 2.523 2.56 2 1.36 
MS 1.201 1.78 3 .60 
MO 2.406 1.55 3 1.09 
MT 1.484 1.53 1 1.06 
NE 2.508 1.71 2 1.09 
NV 1.392 1.35 2 .51 
NH 1.572 1.02 2 .94 
NJ 2.641 1.65 3 1.26 
NM 1.392 1.44 1 1.28 
NY 2.688 3.17 3 1.35 
NC 1.383 2.03 3 .so 
ND 2.340 1.47 1 .95 
OH 2.523 c 2.70 2 1.52 
OK 2.266 1.82 1 1.20 
OR 1.446 1.93 2 1.40 
PA 2.699 3.12 3 1.04 
RI 1.492 1.65 3 1.23 
sc 1.254 1.50 1 .58 
SD 2.123 1. 77 3 .98 
TN 2. 715 1.68 1 1.30 
TX 0.341 2.08 4 .69 
UT 2.448 1.45 1 1.43 
TABLE IX 
(Continued) 
State IV1 IV2 IV3 
VT 1.501 1.09 3 
VA 1.626 2.12 4 
WA 1.583 2.19 3 
wv 2.460 1.26 4 
WI 1.350 2.65 3 
WY 2.530 1.54 2 
IV1 = Gubernatorial strength index by Nelson Dometrius (1979) 
IV2 Legislative professionalism index 
IV3 Agency modernization 
IV4 = State innovative score 
Sc~les: 
IV1- 0 to 3, 3 represents maximum strength 
IV2- 0 to 4, 4 most professional legislature 
IV3- 1 = health department control 
2 = environmental superagency 
3 = little "EPA" 
4 = unconsolidated agencies 
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